Carlos Aquino*
China is a
major actor in the world economy and international politics. It is the second
biggest economy in the world and by the end of this decade it will become the
biggest in the world. It is already the biggest destination for more than 130
countries exports of goods, a major investor in many developing countries, and the
main lender for many of them.
Under Xi
Jinping leadership China´s foreign policy has become more assertive, and with
Trump policy of confronting China (that to a big extent is followed by Biden[1]),
its competition with U.S. is seen as inevitable.
In this
article a review of China’s foreign policy is given. First, its foreign policy
before Xi Jinping is analyzed; Second, the current China foreign policy is
reviewed; Third, China foreign policy toward Latin America is seen; and Last,
some conclusions are given.
A. China´s Foreign Policy before Xi
Jinping
When the People
´s Republic of China was created in 1949 it was a poor country, and its priority
was to ensure its independence, and later when it broke with the Soviet Union, its
aim was to fight against the hegemonism, both of United States, U.S., and the
Soviet Union.
By the end
of 1969, China had established diplomatic relations with more than 50
countries, double of what it had in 1955.
It established
5 principles of peaceful coexistence that have guided much of its foreign
policy. They include: “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”[2].
In the
decade of the 1970s when it saw the opportunity offered by the United States, China
established relations with this country and with many others in the West, to
counterbalance the Soviet Union. In October 1971 China regains its seat in the
United Nations and as one of the five country Permanent members of the Security
Council.
It also had
as the cornerstone of its foreign policy the maintenance of its territorial
integrity (that as many countries as possible recognize that Taiwan is part of China).
China in
December 1978 decided to undertake reforms and open its economy to get out of
the backwardness in which it had been, especially compared with countries such
as Japan and South Korea.
Under Deng
Xiaoping leadership China leaves behind its planned economy system to take
advantage of the capital, know-how, and markets of the West. To ensure its economic
growth, China sought to expand relations with many countries, considering the
provision of natural resources, which it does not have in abundance compared to
its needs.
Chinese
economic growth since 1979 is spectacular. In 2010 it became the second largest
economy in the world surpassing Japan.
Deng
Xiaoping argued that Chinese foreign policy should be characterized by
"hiding strengths and waiting", "hiding weaknesses", and
not "taking a leadership position". He argued to keep a low profile (taoguang
yanhui 韬光养晦) in international affairs. The
priority was economic growth and China should not be distracted from this goal.
China sought
to resolve its problems with its neighbors. At the end of the 1980s China
settled its problems with the Soviet Union (which became Russia) and with South
Korea established diplomatic relations in 1992 for example.
B. China Foreign Policy in the present
It is said
that China foreign policy has changed from Deng Xiaoping policy of “hide your
capacities, bide your time” to Xi assertive foreign policy. Xi assumed power in
2012.
But things
began to change before Xi became leader of China. By the end of the 2000s, the
outcome of the great international financial crisis of 2008-2009 began to
change how China saw the world and its position in it. The Chinese economy
continued to grow while many countries, especially in the West, suffered economic
crisis. The Chinese felt more confident in its own economic and political
system.
Besides
this, Chinese economic growth began to generate some apprehension abroad, although
China emphasized that its rise will be peaceful, that it will be a responsible
superpower, that it will seek to democratize international relations, and that
it will support multilateralism.
In fact,
China presence began to be felt all over the world. By the beginning of the XXI
century, it became the engine of the world economy, and its influence on the
movement of the price of raw materials became evident. It is in this scenario that
Xi Jinping, the most powerful leader that China has had since Mao Zedong (Xi
was elected Secretary General of the Communist Party of China in November 2012
and President of the country in March 2013), took office. In March 2018 the
National People's Congress removed term limits for the President and Vice
President, so paving the way for Xi to remain in power if he wishes to do so (and
many think he wish that).
China began
to strengthen its presence in the world, especially in its immediate area, East
Asia. Its disputes with Japan, Vietnam, and its greater presence in the South
China Sea are proof of this.
China wants
to achieve a developed country status by 2049. It aims to reach the
rejuvenation of the nation, and the Chinese dream (proposed in 2013: to achieve
a strong, civilized, harmonious, beautiful China). It wants to regain the place
it had before its forced opening to the world at the middle of the XIX century.
For most of the last 2000 years China was the biggest and most advanced economy
in the world, even right before its forced opening with the Opium war of
1839-1840.
China wants
to have a greater voice in international affairs. It would like to contribute
more funds to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, but the US will
not let it (as this will mean a major voice of China on those organizations,
with the corresponding decrease of influence of the US).
Anyway, China
is also creating mechanisms to have a greater financial presence in the world,
to make better use of its huge international reserves, and (through
institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New
Development Bank, the Silk Road Fund), etc., participate in the financing of
development and infrastructure of developing countries.
It has
plans to improve its industrial structure with its Made in China 2025 program (revealed
in 2015), and the Belt and Road initiative (announced in 2013, which has five
priority areas of cooperation: policy coordination, connectivity of
infrastructure, trade facilitation, financial cooperation, and people-to-people
exchange).
China wants
to establish itself as the champion of multilateralism (as opposed to Trump's
unilateralism, something that the new Biden administration said will reverse). China
says that it is the standard-bearer of globalization, as it has been the
greatest beneficiary of it.
It has a
win-win proposal, of South-South cooperation, and continues to present itself
as the older brother of developing countries.
Trump's
rise presented a challenge for China. Trump is gone but the major guidelines of
its foreign policy will continue, with the difference that to face China the
Biden administration has said that it will work with its allies and like-minded
parties.
In fact,
China presents a major challenge to US hegemony, the only truly one up to now.
The Soviet Union was considered a challenger but in fact it could not win that
competition. Even if in military terms it achieved some parity with US in
economic terms it was never a competitor. At some point in the 1980s even Japan
was considered by some people a challenger to US in economic terms but with the
burst of its bubble economy at the beginning of the 1990s that was not the
case. Japan lacked two things to have challenged the US. It direly lacks
natural resources and military strength (being dependent in the US for its
security).
China is
different. It will become the biggest economy, among other reasons thanks to its
huge internal market, and its military strength is increasing with time. But
still is behind the US in some advanced technologies like semiconductors, AI,
nanotechnology, etc.
With the
Biden administration US is preparing to keep ahead in the advantages that still
have vis a vis China, and this will assure that competition between them will
persist. The question for some is if this competition will escalate and become a
military one. Some see China and US falling into the called Trap of Thucydides,
where the hegemon struggles to preserve its position against an emerging power
(as was the case of Sparta against Greece).
Already
China influence is bigger in some places, like in Africa, and is becoming
bigger in East Asia, and Latin America. The Russia invasion of Ukraine from February
2022 and the Western economic sanction against Russia is drawing China closer
to it. Perhaps in Asia it is possible to see the growing confrontation between
China and U.S. United States is arranging a broader coalition to confront
China, with the AUKUS, the Quad, and other initiatives. China is bringing Russia
closer to it, increasing for example joint military exercises between their navy
and air forces. And regional powers, like Japan for example, are also taking a
more assertive foreign policy to confront what it sees as a growing military presence
of China in the region.
Let´s focus
China foreign policy in the Latin America region where its presence is rapidly becoming
bigger with time.
C. China foreign policy in Latin
America.
China
presence in Latin America is becoming bigger by the time. Without considering Mexico,
that have a strong relationship with US, China already is the biggest economic
partner of the region, one of its main investors and the main lender. Rapipdly
The People´s
Republic of China began establishing diplomatic relations with most of Latin
America countries in the 1970s after recovering its seat in the United Nations.
But economic relations were still weak, and it began to increase after the
1990s.
At first
China was putting emphasis in having Latin American countries switch diplomatic
recognition from Taiwan. Of the 14 countries in the world recognizing Taiwan,
several of them (and the biggest ones), are in Latin America, like Paraguay
(Nicaragua shifted recognition to China in December 2021).
Economic
relations between China and Latin America began increasing from the 1990s,
thanks to the growing appetite of China for natural resources of the region.
Specially in South America countries have plenty of copper (Chile and Peru),
iron (Peru, Brazil), oil (Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela), soybeans (Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil), etc. Also, cheap manufactured goods from China were demanded
from the region.
The region
benefited specially from the increase in the price of many primary goods that
occurred between 2002-2003 to 2011-2012. China strong demand for those goods
was the reason. In this way China become the biggest export market of several
of them, beginning with Peru and Chile, where more than half their copper (the
main product exported) goes to China.
Also, from
the 1990s and specially from the 2000s onward, China began to invest in the
extraction of natural resources, especially iron, copper, and oil. But China
also became important for countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina,
that after losing access to the international capital markets, began receiving
loans from China.
In this way
China become the major export destination for many Latin American countries,
one of its main investors, and for several of them their major, and unique
lender. Moreover, up to now, 20 countries in the region have joined China Belt
and Road initiative (BRI), the last being Argentina in February 2022.
Six Latin
American countries are members of the Asia Investment Infrastructure Bank, AIIB:
Ecuador, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru. And Peru, the last
country in the region to join the AIIB, contributed with 154.6 million dollars,
around 84% of the total given by countries in Latin America.
Latin American members of the AIIB, millions of dollars
Members |
Ammount given |
Share.% |
Date of incorporationa |
Ecuador |
5 |
3% |
1 noviembre, 2019 |
Uruguay |
5 |
3% |
28 de abril, 2020 |
Brasil |
5 |
3% |
2 de noviembre, 2020 |
Argentina |
5 |
3% |
30 de marzo, 2021 |
Chile |
10 |
5% |
2 de julio, 2021 |
Perú |
154.6 |
84% |
14 de enero, 2022 |
Total LAC |
184.6 |
1% |
|
Total Non regional members |
23,073 |
Source: https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html
China have
tried to work with Latin American countries through the China-CELAC forum, but
it has not been easy. The first forum of the China and the Community of Latin
American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was in 2015 in Beijing, but the region
does not have a common voice vis a vis China. That is why, most of the
relations between China and the region is done bilaterally.
Given the
economic structure of the region, dependent in the export of primary goods, its
economic reliance in China will increase. Also, as China invests more in
infrastructure projects and the region is in much need of this kind of
investment, China involvement in the region in this aspect will increase,
helped by the BRI to which most of the countries have joined.
At the beginning
of the COVID-19 pandemics China got closer to the region as many of them had to
rely in the provision of the Chinese vaccines. China´s Sinopharm and Sinovac,
two of its companies manufacturing them, becoming the main providers of the
vaccines[3]
for countries like Peru. But from the second half of the 2021, as other
vaccines become available, and their efficacy was shown to be better than
Chinese vaccines, like of Pfizer and Moderna, China position as provider become
less important.
China growing
presence in Latin America rose suspicion in the U.S. as the region is
considered U.S. backyard. One area of possible conflict will be when countries
in the region will adopt the 5G technology. US has pushed other countries, like
United Kingdom and Australia, to exclude Chinese companies like Huawei, from
participating in the nationals 5G network. Ecuador under Lenin government got a
loan in January 2021 from the US to prepaid Chinese loan with the condition
that it excludes Chinese technology in this field[4].
Chile also
adopted for the lying of a Transpacific submarine fiber optic cable a proposal
different from the one offered by Huawei and Chinese companies, that would have
directly linked Chile to China. Instead, it chose a proposal from Japan, in
part it is said because of US concern[5].
Source: Nikkei Asia: https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Telecommunication/Chile-picks-Japan-s-trans-Pacific-cable-route-in-snub-to-China
US and
western countries in the G7 are trying to offer an alternative to China
financing in infrastructure under its Belt and Road Initiative. In the last G7
meeting in June 2022 they launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure
and Investment and plan to raise 600 million dollars for investment in low- and
middle-income countries in the next five years[6].
D.
Conclusions
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the support that
China is seen giving to Russia has hardened the position of US to compete with
China. As Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said in a May 2022 speech “China is the only country with both the intent
to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic,
military, and technological power to do it”[7].
In this
regard, competition between the two superpowers will increase, and the Latin
American region is becoming one of the battlegrounds of that competition.
*Carlos Aquino is Director of CEAS
[1] See US White House: “Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance”, March 2021: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf
[2] China´s MOFA website: The Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1179045.shtml#:~:text=They%20include%3A%20mutual%20respect%20for,mutual%20benefit%2C%20and%20peaceful%20coexistence.
[3]Latin America turns to
China and Russia for COVID-19 vaccines:
[5] See Nikkei Asia: https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Telecommunication/Chile-picks-Japan-s-trans-Pacific-cable-route-in-snub-to-China
[6] See CNBC: https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/28/new-g-7-infrastructure-plan-offers-alternative-to-china-belt-road-.html
[7] See US Department of State: https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/