sábado, 30 de septiembre de 2023

Internationalization of the yuan and Latin America

 

Ver tambien: https://www.slideshare.net/carlosalbertoaquinorodriguez/internationalization-of-the-yuan-and-latin-americadocx


                                                                                        Carlos Aquino Rodriguez[i]

The world is experiencing a shift in the centre of economic and political power in the last decades, from the West to the East, from the Northern part of the hemisphere to the Southern part. The role of developing and emerging economies is increasing with time. This can be seen in the growing weight of those emerging and developing economies in indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), trade, investment.

But one area where still the role of western developed countries is still big, despite its diminishing importance in the indicators mentioned above, it is in the field as the most used international currencies, in international finance and trade. In these field the United States (U.S.) dollar is the most widely used. The dollar accounts for more than half of international reserves, trade transactions, and international lending. This despite the U.S. representing less than 25% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and no more than 12% of global trade.

But in the last years other currencies, little by little, are increasing their importance in the international financial markets and global trade. One of them and the one that have more possibilities to compete with the dollar, is the Chinese renminbi (or yuan).

In this article it will be seen how that process is happening, first by describing the present situation of the dollar and other currencies use in trade and international finance; second it will be analysed which conditions will be needed for the yuan to become a widely used international currency; third, it will be seen how that process in happening in Latin America, a region with increasing trade and financial links to China; and last, some Conclusions will be given.    

I.                   Present situation of the dollar and other currencies use in trade and international finance.

After the Second World War, as the United States become not only the biggest economy in the world but also the most powerful in military and political terms, the use of its currency, the dollar, become predominant.

 

But after the many changes in the world economy, with the increasing importance of the developing and emerging economies, in particular those in East Asia, like China, and the decrease in importance of U.S. in the world economy and world trade, the use of the dollar has been decreasing, for example, in the last 20 years.

 

As seen in Graph 1, in the year 2000, dollar accounted for around 70% of international reserves, but in 2022 its share has diminished to around 59%.

 

Graph 1: Share of the dollar in international reserves compared to other currencies.

Gráfico, Gráfico de líneas

Descripción generada automáticamente

Source: GZERO https://www.gzeromedia.com/by-ian-bremmer/the-dollar-is-dead-long-live-the-dollar

In the following Table it can be seen that, at the first quarter of the year 2023, of the total of allocated reserves, 59.01% are claims in US dollars, and in second place is the euro with 19.77% of the total. After that is Japanese yen and pound sterling. In fifth place are claims in Chinese renminbi (or yuan) with 2.58% of the total.  

Table 1. World official foreign exchange reserves by currencies (in billion US dollars)

Imagen que contiene Tabla

Descripción generada automáticamente

Source: IMF: https://data.imf.org/?sk=e6a5f467-c14b-4aa8-9f6d-5a09ec4e62a4

In the last years also, some economies are diminishing their holdings of United States Treasury Securities. For example, China Treasury holdings peaked at over 1.3 trillion dollars in fall 2013, when it was the largest, but after that, it has been decreasing[ii]. In June 2022, China holdings were 939 billion dollars, but in June 2023 it was 835 billion dollars. See Table 2.             

Table 2: Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities

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Descripción generada automáticamente con confianza media

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury https://ticdata.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/slt_table5.txt

 

The use of the dollar as a “weapon” by U.S. in the last years is also pushing many countries to use other currencies. U.S. has implemented economic sanctions against many countries, beginning with, Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela. The last country to be affected by economic sanctions is the Russian Federation because of the war in Ukraine. U.S. implemented measures to cut Russia off from access to dollars. Russian central bank was denied access to most of its international reserves held in major world currencies at western central and commercial banks.

 

Also, in other fields the use of the dollar is still predominant. In trade invoicing for example it is 50% of the total. In cross-border loans is 50% of the total, and in foreign exchange transaction volume its use accounts for 88% of the total. See Graph 2.

 

Graph 2. International use of the dollar 

Gráfico, Gráfico de barras

Descripción generada automáticamente

Source: GZERO https://www.gzeromedia.com/by-ian-bremmer/the-dollar-is-dead-long-live-the-dollar

But in the last years the use of the dollar in global trade is being shunned by some countries. The clearer case is for example Russia, especially in its trade with China. As can be seen in Graph 3, ten years ago, in 2013, Russian exports to China were settled more than 95% in dollars, but by 2020 the use of the dollar has decreased to only 22.7%. And that was before the war in Ukraine and the economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the U.S.

Graph 3. Use of dollars in Russia export to China

Gráfico

Descripción generada automáticamente

Source: Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/russia-and-china-partners-in-dedollarization/

Now, according to a statement given by President Vladimir Putin in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum last June, over 80% of trade settlements between Russia and China are conducted in Russian ruble and Chinese yuan[iii]. As it will be seen bellow, in the case of Latin America, other countries are also trying not to use dollars in their trade transactions and in investment projects, instead using yuan. This means the internationalization of the yuan is advancing and more countries are involved in the process.     

II.                 Which conditions will be needed for the yuan to become a truly international currency?

China is now the second biggest world economy, with around 18% of the total[iv]. It is the largest global trader, with a share of 13% of the total[v]. It is the third largest investor in the world (in the year 2022, but it was the second largest in 2021)[vi].

But still the use of the yuan as an international currency is minor, despite its weight in the world economy. What would be needed for China´s currency to increase its presence in world trade and finance?

For this perhaps it is useful to see why the dollar is widely used. Among other reasons for that are:

1.     There are no capital controls for the inflow or outflow of dollars in U.S. This free movement of capital is one of the most appealing features for foreigners to hold dollars, either in U.S. or abroad.

2.     The exchange rate of the dollar is freely determined by the market.

3.     U.S. financial market offer an abundance of dollar-denominated assets that foreign investors can freely trade.

4.     Also, it is said that U.S. offer stable government institutions, independent central bank, strong property rights, and a robust rule of law.

To the above it should be added that U.S. was also able to push for the wider use of the dollar through its dominance of international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Then, China must work for a freer movement of its capital. Its currency should be freely tradable (convertible), and the yuan exchange rate should be determined totally free of any interference. Besides this, Chinese monetary policy should be more transparent and stable. Its capital market should offer more attractive instruments for foreigners to invest in yuan, with little restrictions. All these measures should be done gradually considering the interest of the national economy and to avoid speculative movements of capital that could destabilize the country. 

China is also working to increase its presence in the international financial market by way of the establishment, with other countries, of institutions like the Asia Investment and Infrastructure Bank, AIIB, and the New Development Bank or BRICS Bank. Dilma Rousseff, the head of the New Development Bank recently said that the Bank is planning to lend in Brazilian and South African currencies to reduce reliance on the dollar[vii].    

III.              How is the internationalization of the yuan happening in Latin America?

For Latin American countries, that have increasing economic links with China, it would be natural to settle their economic transactions not in dollars but in yuan. But even if still the use of the Chinese currency in the region is minor, compared to the dollar[viii], some countries are moving to increase the use of the yuan in its economic transactions with China or even with other countries.

Among the reasons for that is that indeed trade and investment relations of China with Latin American countries are becoming more important. For example, as can be seen in Table 3, for countries like Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, their main export market is China, and for countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Paraguay, their main source of imports is China.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 3. First and second main partner in total exports and import of goods in some Latin American countries, year 2022, in percentage.

Country

Imports

Exports

Argentina

1.     China   20.8%

2.     Brazil   19.9%

1.     Brazil           14.3%

2.     China             8.9%

Bolivia

1.     China   19.4%

2.     Brazil    15.1%

1.     India             16.5%

2.     Brazil            13.8%

Brazil

1.     China   22.2%

2.     U.S.     18.9%

1.     China           26.8%

2.     U.S.              11.2%

Chile

1.     U.S.      23.9%

2.     China   23.1%

1.     China           37.9%

2.     U.S.              15.2%

Colombia

1.     U.S.      24.5%

2.     China   24.1%

1.     U.S.              30.9%

2.     Panama      14.6%

Ecuador

1.     U.S.      25.9%

2.     China   22.0%

1.     U.S.              27.7%

2.     China           17.6%

Peru

1.     China   26.1%

2.     U.S.      23.6%

1.     China            30.0%

2.     U.S.               14.5%

Paraguay

1.     China   29.5%

2.     Brazil    23.5%

1.     Brazil             36.8%

2.     Argentina     19.5%       

Uruguay

1.     Brazil    19.9%

2.     China    18.1%

1.     China            21.4%

2.     Free Zones   19.0%       

Source: Trade Map, Data for Cuba and Venezuela is very outdated

China has Free Trade Area (FTA) agreements with Chile, Peru, Costa Rica[ix], and this year it has signed FTAs with Nicaragua, and Ecuador. These agreements will help increase trade between China and countries in the region.

China is also becoming an important investor in the region. It began in the 1990s investing in the natural resources sector but now invest in several sector, like infrastructure and manufacturing sector. For example, it is estimated that Chinese Foreign Direct Investment, FDI stock at the end of 2022 was 24% of the total in Peru, 22.8% in Argentina, and 9.5% in Brazil[x]

Up to now, 21 countries in the region has joined the Belt and Road Initiative: These countries are (in order of joining it, from the first to the last): Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Surinam, Dominica, Bolivia, Guyana, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Grenada, El Salvador, Chile, Dominican Republic, Cuba, Ecuador, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Jamaica, Peru, Nicaragua, and the last one, Argentina, which joined in February 2022[xi].

Several Latin American countries have joined the Asia Investment and Infrastructure Bank, AIIB: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay[xii], and Bolivia and Venezuela are prospective members.           

China has bilateral swap lines (BSL) with several Latin American countries. In a BSL central bank of two countries agree to acquire each other´s currency in exchange of its own. Argentina, Brazil, Surinam, and Chile central banks have established BSL with China.

In concrete terms, for example in august this year Argentina signed a deal with China´s central bank to settle more than half of the 2.7 billion dollars debt due to be paid the first week of that month to the IMF. For this it used the yuan equivalent to 1.7 billion dollars under the swap arrangement it has with the People´s Bank of China[xiii].

Regarding investment, also in Argentina in august it was announced that a Chinese company, Brunt Recycling, did through Bank of China an investment in its business of lithium, of 428,736 yuan, or an equivalent of 58,892 dollars[xiv].

In trade, from May this year Bolivia began using yuan to pay for some exports and imports. Bolivia Economic Minister said in June that between May and July his country conducted financial operations amounting to 278 million yuan (around 38.7 million dollars)[xv].

In august Brazil proposed to Argentina that it could use yuan guarantees in its exports. In this way Brazilian companies will be provided with yuan guarantees under a credit line of an equivalent of 144 million dollars, to be offered to Argentine importers[xvi]. This proposal involves Argentina providing yuan-denominated guarantees that match the credit line amount.

Still, the countries in Latin America that are using yuan in their international transactions, are countries that have some problems with balance of payments and scarcity of dollars, like Argentina and Bolivia. But it is foreseeable that in the future more Latin American countries would use yuan.

One interesting case is Brazil, that for example, with President Lula, is a strong advocate of using a different currency than the dollar. Brazil reached an agreement with China to access the Cross-border Interbank payment System, the China equivalent to international financial messaging service Swift[xvii], in April this year. Also, Brazil´s yuan-denominated foreign exchange assets reached a percentage of 5.37% at the end of 2022, the second largest after the dollar and surpassing the euro assets[xviii].     

 

Conclusions

-         Several countries are beginning to use other currencies than the dollar, among other reasons, because U.S. use its currency as a “weapon.”

      Given China growing presence in the world economy, global trade, and international finance, use of its currency will increase.

      But for the yuan to become a widely used international currency China should execute some reforms

      Through institutions like the AIIB, the New Development Bank, and Chinese lending, international use of its currency will increase.

      Given the strong economic links between Latin American countries and China, it will be natural for them to use more yuan.

             

 

                                                                                      September 17th, 2023

 

 

 

 



[i] Carlos Aquino Rodriguez is Director of the Centre for Asian Studies, National University of San Marcos, Lima, Peru.

[ii] Nikkei Asia: China´s U.S. Treasury holding hit 12-year low on rate hikes, tensions https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Bonds/China-s-U.S.-Treasury-holdings-hit-12-year-low-on-rate-hikes-tensions

[iii] Global Times: Over 80% of Russia-China trade settlement now using local currencies: Russian president   https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202306/1292737.shtml

[v] See WTO World Trade Statistical Review 2023 https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wtsr_2023_e.pdf

[vi] See UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2023 https://unctad.org/publication/world-investment-report-2023

[vii] Financial Times: BRICS banks strive to reduce reliance on the dollar https://www.ft.com/content/1c5c6890-3698-4f5d-8290-91441573338a

[viii] The Dialogue: China´s RMB isn´t set to outpace the dollars in Latin America...yet  https://www.thedialogue.org/blogs/2023/06/chinas-rmb-isnt-set-to-outpace-the-dollar-in-latin-americayet/

[x] Based in data by the American Enterprise Institute in its report of July 2023: “China´s Global Investment surges, finally” https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/chinas-global-investment-surges-finally/, and  UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2023 https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2023_en.pdf

[xi] Global Times: China, Latin America brace for deeper ties in BRI cooperation https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202304/1288649.shtml

[xiv] Telam: El Banco de China realizo la primera inversión directa en yuanes en Argentina https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/202308/638731-banco-de-china-yuan-inversiones-argentina.html

[xv] AP: Bolivia is the latest South American nation to use China´s yuan for trade in challenge to the dollar https://apnews.com/article/yuan-bolivia-trade-argentina-brazil-dollar-696bfb7c5ab68d4f0a87a7f6557678f0

[xvi] Reuters: Brazil propose yuan guarantees for exports to  Argentina, finance minister says      https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/brazil-proposes-yuan-guarantees-exports-argentina-finance-minister-says-2023-08-23/

[xvii] Swift stands for “Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Communications”

[xviii] South China Morning Post: Which 8 countries are using China´s yuan more, and what does it means for the US dollar?  https://www.scmp.com/economy/economic-indicators/article/3220087/which-8-countries-are-using-chinas-yuan-more-and-what-does-it-mean-us-dollar

viernes, 14 de julio de 2023

China en el Peru

 


China cada vez tiene una mayor presencia en el Peru.

En el comercio:

De enero a mayo del 2023, alrededor del 36% de todas las exportaciones de bienes del Peru fueron a China. A EE. UU. solo fue solo el 13.7%[1]. El año 2022 a China fue el 32.9% del total, y el 2021 el 34.7% (el 2010 solo el 15% de las exportaciones peruanas fueron a China, lo mismo que a EE. UU., y el 2000 EE. UU. era el primer destino con 27.5% del total y China el cuarto con 6.4%[2]). En importaciones de bienes el 2022 el 25% del total vino de China, de EE. UU. el 24%[3]. Las exportaciones son el motor de la economía peruana. El año 2022 el Peru exporto 63,193 millones de dólares, el 2010 exporto unos 35,805 millones de dólares[4], y el 2000 las exportaciones fueron de 7,028 millones de dólares[5] (y 3,276 millones de dólares en 1990[6]).  

En promedio, un 35% de las exportaciones del Peru va a China. El 60% de las exportaciones peruanas son minerales, y 52% de esas exportaciones mineras van a China, y un 47% de los productos pesqueros. El cobre constituyo el 30% de las exportaciones peruanas el 2022, y casi el 74% de ese metal fue a China. La empresa Las Bambas (de un consorcio de las empresas chinas MMG Limited, Guoxin International Investment Co. Ltd. y CITIC Metal Co. Ltd.) es la cuarta empresa que más exporta minerales en el país, Shougang es la séptima, Toromocho (de Aluminun Corporation of China-Chinalco) es la novena (a mayo del 2023). (datos de MINCETUR).

Peru tiene un Tratado de Libre Comercio con China en vigencia desde el 2010. Se está negociando actualmente una actualización, modernización, de ese TLC.

En inversiones:

China tiene invertido más de 30 mil millones de dólares en el Perú, de acuerdo con datos de su propia Embajada[7]. A fines del 2022, de acuerdo con cifras de la UNCTAD, en el Peru había un stock de inversión extranjera directa de 129,541 millones de dólares (UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2022)[8]. De ser así, la inversión China representaría mas de 23% del total, probablemente el mayor de todos. De acuerdo con Proinversion (entidad del gobierno peruano), a fines del 2022 había unos 30,190 millones de dólares de Inversión Extranjera directa, IED, en el Peru y Reino Unido era el mayor inversor con 5,427 millones de dólares y segundo España con 5,227 millones de dólares. China estaba en octavo puesto con 1,131 millones de dólares[9] (aunque obviamente esa no es la verdadera cifra de la inversión de este país en Peru).

Por ejemplo, solo la inversión china en las Bambas ya alcanza los 10 mil millones de dólares. Esta mina se dice produce el equivalente al 1% del PIB del Peru y 2% de la producción mundial de cobre[10]. Las empresas chinas controlan prácticamente el 100% de la producción de hierro, y entre el 20% y 25% de la de cobre. 

En los últimos años China invierte más en infraestructura física en Peru. Por ejemplo, se dice que quizás ya un cuarto de la producción y 40% de la distribución de electricidad en el país es controlada por empresas chinas, ccomo China Southern Power Grid International China y Three Georges Corporation[11].

Esta también la inversión en el Puerto de Chancay, ubicado a 90 kilómetros al norte de Lima, que será el puerto más moderno en el Pacifico Sur Latinoamericano, donde un 60% es de la empresa Cosco Shipping Corporation. Contempla una inversión total de 3,600 millones de dólares.

Peru es miembro de la iniciativa china de la franja y la ruta desde el 2019, y es miembro del Banco Asiático de Inversión e Infraestructura, BAII, y dio un aporte de 154.6 millones de dólares, el mayor de Latinoamérica (solo 6 países en la región han hecho aportes: Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru y Uruguay), y ese monto dado por el Peru representa el 84% del total dado por los países de la región[12].

Peru ha recibido muy poca Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo o prestamos del gobierno chino.

En el sector tecnológico:

A fines de febrero del 2023 el presidente de la Comisión de Transportes y Comunicaciones del Congreso de la República, junto con la vicepresidenta de la Comisión de Fiscalización viajaron a Madrid para el Mobile World Congress (MWC) invitados por la empresa Huawei. (diario El Comercio 12 de julio del 2023). En junio del 2023 6 congresistas viajaron a China invitados por una empresa del rubro tecnológico (Comercio 12-7-2023).

China está invirtiendo en la formación de recursos humanos para tecnología 5G, Huawei en particular, en Universidades como UNMSM[13] y UNI[14].

Relaciones con el sector académico

La mayoría de los que estudian o investigan sobre China se han formado en China, China cada vez da mas becas y financia participación en Conferencias. También las relaciones académicas con centros que investigan sobre China son mayormente con instituciones de ese país.

Existen 4 Institutos Confucio en el Peru, dos en Lima y dos en el interior del país, ubicados uno en el Norte y otro en el Sur. Todas esos Centros están en Universidades privadas[15]. 

Peru frente a la competencia China EE. UU.

Se habla de que los dos países se encaminan a una rivalidad sistémica, desacoplamiento, y creación de dos cadenas de suministro paralelas, pues uno no quiere depender del otro. Y que la competencia podría afectar al resto de países si estos se ven obligado a tomar partido por uno de ellos. Y esas dos potencias (poderes) podrían ejercer presión sobre el resto.

Lo recomendable es no depender mucho de uno de ellos, diversificar, aunque esto no es fácil. Se dice que el país depende ahora mucho de China, en sus exportaciones, por ejemplo. Pero dada la estructura de la economía peruana y de sus exportaciones, de mayormente de materias primas, no hay muchas alternativas. Y el Peru también necesita inversiones en infraestructura y no hay muchas fuentes de donde conseguir eso.

Se habla también de que quizás esa competencia, desacoplamiento, puede beneficiar al resto de países. Por ejemplo, de que ya que para las empresas de EE. UU. el onshoring no es tan factible, se favorece el nearshoring, o friend-shoring. México se está beneficiando de eso. El Peru podría hacerlo siempre que se den las condiciones (ambiente social más estable, incentivos económicos, etc.)

 

 



[5] Según el Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, BCRP:  https://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Memoria/2000/Memoria-BCRP-2000-3.pdf

[6] BCRP, y China no aparecía entre los 10 primeros lugares como destino de exportaciones. https://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Memoria/1990/Memoria-BCRP-1990-2.pdf Pagina 12. Aparece en 1991 como el quinto destino con 5% y EE. UU. era el primero con 22.1% del total https://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Memoria/1991/Memoria-BCRP-1991-2.pdf

viernes, 31 de marzo de 2023

United States efforts to decouple from China and implications for Peru.

 United States is implementing a series of measures to try to cut off its dependence from China in certain areas, or to deny China access to certain technologies. In this sense, US is enlisting the help of some of its allies, as seen in the case of its effort to cut the flow of advanced semiconductors to China, as in the formation of the Chips 4 Alliance. Japan and Taiwan seem to be already on board in this idea. Netherlands, not a member of that alliance, is also participating. Still South Korea has not officially joined the Alliance.

What about Peru? Can Peru join in the effort to isolate China as US is planning to do? What, if any, can Peru do in that regard?

In this article a look at that issue is given. First, a brief review of Peru relations with China and US is given; second, in which areas could Peru cooperate with US effort is analyzed; and lastly, it is seen if really Peru can join that effort.

1.     Peru relations with China and United States

China became, from the beginning of last decade, the biggest trade partner of Peru. In 2022 Peru exports of goods to China were 32.9% of its total exports, while to US was only 13.6%. Imports of Peru from both China and US were around the same proportion, 25% of the total for each one. Then, Peru is dependent on the Chinese market for its exports, mainly of copper, which account for 30.5% of Peru´s total exports, and China is the destination for 73.6% of Peru´s copper exports.

Peru has Free Trade Agreements with both US and China. With the first from 2009 and with China from 2010.

Regarding investment, at the end of 2021 there was a stock of 117.8 billion dollars of Foreign Direct Investment, FDI, in Peru, of which around 26% was from China[1]. The amount of FDI from US in Peru, accordingly to US data at the end of 2019 was a stock of 7.5 billion dollars.[2] Probably US investment is bigger than that amount, but not as big as of China. According to Peru data, which is not reliable because it does not record all FDI in the country, at the end of 2022 there was a stock of 30.19 billion dollars of FDI, of which from US was 10.7% of the total, and from China 3.7% of the total[3]. Anyway, in the last years there has been no new US investment in Peru, but China continues increasing its investment in the country.

Regarding exchange of students and people, for many Peruvians US is still the desired destination for study. According to US data, by July 2022, there were more than 3,500 Peruvian students in US and almost 4,000 US students in Peru[4]. Data for China is not available but probably the number of Peruvian students in China, and of Chinese students in Peru is quite low, though in the last years it is increasing the number of Peruvians students going to China, because, among other reasons, the Chinese government is offering many scholarships to Peruvian students.

Regarding economic cooperation, specifically bilateral assistance, US has been in the last decade the second largest contributor to Peru. According to a report, from 2011 to 2019 Peru received 4.4 billion dollars in bilateral assistance from the DAC of OECD countries, and from that amount 24.5% came from US, being the second largest donor to Peru, after Germany which contributed with around 28% of the total, and in third place was Japan with around 14%.[5] For bilateral assistance received from China there is no available data, but probably is not meaningful.

For Peru, China is becoming more important in the economic aspect, but still US is important for Peru in the political and military aspect. US has provided armaments to Peru armed forces, and also Russia, but China not. And Peru is in the America continent, where US is the most important country for many Latin America ones, and certainly will remain that way in the foreseeable future.

 

II.  In which areas can Peru cooperate with US?

US competition with China happens in several areas. Regarding Peru possible involvement in that issue, perhaps it could in the following ones:

1.     Access to valuable raw materials, like lithium: Lithium is considered a strategic material needed for industries like batteries, for electric vehicles. This material is not abundant or easily to exploit, and in fact a few countries hold most of the mineral that could easily be exploited. Some countries in South America are well endowed with lithium. The so-called lithium triangle, along the borders of Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile, is said to hold around 60% of the world reserves. But in fact, Peru also has lithium around that triangle[6].

Peru has lithium and it is said that Chinese companies could be interested, as they are present now in those south American countries[7]. US criticize China involvement in the exploitation of theses resource, in particular, in the lithium triangle[8]

But the perspectives for the exploitation of lithium in Peru is not good now, among other reasons, because most of the mineral is situated in Puno, a region that is home to many social protests, where local communities have opposed other mining projects. Also, Peru government has not developed any framework to exploit that resource yet[9]. And there is only one company interested in the exploitation of this product. American Lithium, a company from Canada, is the owner of a lithium and uranium deposit in the Puno region[10].

2.     Peru adoption of the 5G technology

5G technology will be adopted by all countries. But still there is no data set for that in Peru[11]. It is known that Chinese companies, like Huawei, are the leaders in this field. In Peru Huawei is establishing itself as a leader in mobile technology and has cooperation agreement for example with San Marcos National University[12] and other public and private universities[13] to foster human capital in those areas.  

It is well known that US is pressuring some countries not to adopt 5G technology from China. It has done it in Europe, in Asia, and is doing in Latin America. For example, it is said that US pressed Ecuador not to adopt Chinese technology for its 5G network in exchange for extending a loan in January 2021[14]. Also, Chile government in 2020 decided to adopt a Japanese proposal for building an undersea fiber-optical cable, instead of a Chinese proposal that would have directly linked Chile with China, because of US pressure[15]. What will happen when Peru decides to adopt 5G technology?

III. Can Peru join US efforts to isolate China?

As has been seen, Peru has important economic links with China. China is its biggest trade partner, and around one third of Peru goods are exported to that country. Also, China is already the main investor in the country.

In 2019, when Mike Pompeo, then US secretary of State, visited Peru, he told the government that Peru must be very careful when taking a decision to implement 5G technology. He said that Huawei is an entity linked to the Chinese government and Peru data could/would go directly to China.[16]

Many considerations will have to be taken when adopting 5G technology from China´s Huawei. One of the concerns is for example about how access to Huawei technology will be sustainable in the face of growing sanctions that US is implementing against this company. US would cut off completely access to US technology to Huawei soon[17].

In some circles in government and academy in Peru, there is beginning to be an informal debate about how much Peru is being linked to China, and what this will mean this in the face of confrontation between the two big superpowers: China and US, and how this will affect Peru decision in that regard. Lessons are studied of, for example, how Australia and New Zealand are dealing with that dilemma. Australia in particular, a country much dependent in China market for its goods, had some problems when it criticized China at the beginning of 2020[18].

Anyway, still how Peru could or would help US intent on containing China, if that is the case, and how would react to China response to that, is not known. It is a theme not debated yet, but one that must be done. This author is much interested in that theme and will continue writing about it[19].    

 

 

                                                                                             March 22, 2023

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 



[1] According to data from the Chinese Embassy in Peru and UNCTAD.

[4] According to US Department of State: https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-peru/

[5] See MOFA: “Evaluation of Japan´s ODA to the Republic of Peru”  page 22 https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/FY2021/pdfs/peru.pdf

[6] See the interview with Walter Sanchez of Peru´s Ministry of Energy and Mining: https://www.bnamericas.com/en/interviews/perus-take-on-the-future-of-lithium

[11] I could take to a former Vice Minister of Communications one month ago about this theme. 

[12] From 2018 Huawei signed several agreements with my university to foster experts in science and technology, in the information and communication technology. The last one was signed recently on March 2023. See: https://unmsm.edu.pe/noticias-y-eventos/noticias/noticia-detalle/san-marcos-y-huawei-promoveran-talento-digital-de-estudiantes-y-docentes#:~:text=futuro%20o%20el-,ICT,-Competition%20de%20la  and also  https://viceacademico.unmsm.edu.pe/?news=sanmarquinos-ganan-concursos-tecnologicos-de-huawei-por-cuarto-ano-consecutivo

[19] This author is talking to several policy makers about this theme now but still there is no formal debate.